Participants produce steep typicality gradients and large prototype-enhancement effects in dot-distortion category tasks, showing that in these tasks to-be-categorized items are compared to a prototypical representation that is the central tendency of the participant's exemplar experience. These prototype-abstraction processes have been ascribed to low-level mechanisms in primary visual cortex. Here we asked whether higher-level mechanisms in visual cortex can also sometimes support prototype abstraction. To do so, we compared dot-distortion performance when the stimuli were size constant (allowing some low-level repetition-familiarity to develop for similar shapes) or size variable (defeating repetition-familiarity effects). If prototype formation is only mediated by low-level mechanisms, stimulus-size variability should lessen prototype effects and flatten typicality gradients. Yet prototype effects and typicality gradients were the same under both conditions, whether participants learned the categories explicitly or implicitly and whether they received trial-by-trial reinforcement during transfer tests. These results broaden out the visual-cortical hypothesis because low-level visual areas, featuring retinotopic perceptual representations, would not support robust category learning or prototype-enhancement effects in an environment of pronounced variability in stimulus size. Therefore, higher-level cortical mechanisms evidently can also support prototype formation during categorization.
Introduction
Categorization-the formation and use of psychological equivalence classes-is a basic ability that is critical to all domains of cognition and to survival. For this reason, categorization is a sharp research focus (e.g., Ashby & Maddox, 1992; Homa, Sterling, & Trepel, 1981; Kruschke, 1992; Medin, 1975; Murphy, 2003; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Smith & Minda, 1998) .
There is strong evidence that humans sometimes categorize objects using prototypes. That is, category learners average or blend the category members they experience to form a prototype, compare new to-be-categorized items to it, and accept these items as category members if they are similar enough to the prototype (e.g., Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Cook & Smith, 2006; Smith, 2002; Smith, Chapman, & Redford, 2010; Smith & Minda, 1998 , 2001 , 2002 . Humans' capacity for prototype abstraction can be illustrated using the influential dot-distortion category task (e.g., Blair & Homa, 2001; Homa et al., 1981; Knowlton & Squire, 1993; Posner, Goldsmith, & Welton, 1967; Smith, Redford, & Haas, 2008; Smith et al., 2010) . In this task, participants are trained on a family of shapes that are all distortions of an originating prototype, and they are then asked to endorse (or not) previously unseen probe items as belonging in the trained category. These probe items are copies of the prototype, low-and high-level distortions of it, and random items outside the trained category (Fig. 1, rows 1-4 , respectively).
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